Statements that in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, there are "hard ethnocracies" and even "neo-Nazi regimes", by themselves, are not something new in the set of Putin's foreign ministry vocabulary, as well as circling around the media and Kremlin’s staff writers. Recently, however, it is already impossible not to notice that the frequency of such claims has increased, and the level of people who said that has been gradually becoming more and more serious. (The latest example -. Argument Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko, the "oppression of Russian" in the Baltic republics) It is logical to assume that we are dealing not just with the maintenance of a sustained propaganda degrees, and with advocacy training to something more or less serious.
It only remains to understand (in this case, as far as possible, by not falling into hysterical propaganda), to which it can prepare for the Kremlin in the Baltic area.
First of all, you need to clearly present what is really necessary to the government of the Russian Federation from the Baltic States.
After the annexation of Crimea in Ukrainian and some Russian opposition media has become fashionable to compare Putin with Hitler (however, I have to justify the media because there was a supply of Putin and his entourage which was inspired themselves). However, such a comparison, there is a very significant error, which leads us to misunderstanding the whole picture. For Hitler really was concerned – in his own way – for the welfare of ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) and that concern was really one of the determining factors of the foreign policy of the Third Reich.
In contrast, the interests of the proper Russians, and even more, the Russians, who live abroad, have never been important for the Kremlin. Moreover, the Russian Federation was originally built as a multi-ethnic and, in fact, anti-Russian state. It was under Putin began a massive replacement immigration from Central Asia and Transcaucasia. The mass repression of the Russian nationalists began under Putin. And the Kremlin has always been absolutely indifferent to the fate of ethnic Russian in the Central Asian or Caucasian republics, as well as to what happens to them in the Russian North Caucasus.
Consequently, real or imaginary difficulties, which may be the Russian people in the Baltic countries, are not an incentive for the Kremlin. And so those who believe that the problem can be solved, if Riga finally hear Ushakov, or err in good faith or engaged in the manipulation.
Is there any economic, military or political issues, for which the Kremlin would be worth to put pressure on the Baltic states?
There was and there is an economic interaction, strictly speaking. And so it remained, you must not bully neighbor, and just the opposite.
What is for military forces? Again, it is obvious that it is the Kremlin military exercises in Ukraine has led to the fact that NATO is stepping up its presence in the Baltic region and Latvia (finally) to modernize and strengthen its own army.
But with all politics more interesting - both internal and external.
As for domestic policy, it is all clearly emerges. Like any authoritarian and totalitarian regime, a wannabe with a falling economy, the Russian regime has to gradually replace the material and economic incentives for their nationals ideological. Rations now give not meat, bread and milk, but only greatness.
All the Russian grandeur developed and exhausted in the Crimea. Then the source of greatness was found in the Donbas. When it ended and there have established import from Syria, but unfortunately had to close quickly. He formed a "breakthrough", which must be something to replace. The struggle for the "right" to "Russian-speaking", in this sense, is the best direction. However, the fight for the rights of Russian, where they really are oppressed - such as in the republics of Central Asia - Putin, not with his hands, because notwithstanding that the republic go his allies. Ukrainian card played, Belarus - especially not an option. It remains the Baltics. So, if the new "patriotic" show somewhere and will be held, most likely, it is here.
Moreover, it is logical and within the framework of foreign policy, so to speak, the Kremlin's strategy - a strategy built on nomenclature-mafia patterns. It is easy to note that Putin has already tried twice to carry out the exchange. For the first time - the exchange of the Donbas to Crimea. The second time - the exchange of Syria in the Crimea. It is reasonable to assume that he is now going on the third set, and will try to change, for example, Latvia in Crimea. Like, we stop to make a row in the Baltics, and you go for it has made concessions to the Crimea.
Given the fact that Latvia and Estonia are NATO and EU members, this scheme is strictly true (again, within the nomenclature and mafia world): that is hitched others, you are not so scary it was, and that's when their - here -That's own shirt is closer to the body seem.
Here it is necessary to make a reservation at once: after the Crimean adventure we have to admit that Putin is mentally unhealthy. And so now he can wait and quite insane and therefore not completely predictable decisions. And we must always keep in mind, so to speak, a factor of Putin's madness.
But to dwell on it only is not necessary. As for the rational part, then it looks as follows.
The Kremlin is not interested in the great war, and in a small too. Ukraine's experience has shown that, where Putin's troops face at least with some resistance, their victorious march rather quickly stall (remember that in the spring of 2014 talked about the "liberation" of Odessa and Kherson, but two years later, on the outskirts of Donetsk are gone). Consequently, according to the strategy of Surkov, need not war and preparation for war, and the imitation of all this.
By all indications, this is what we are seeing. The creation of new military units, demonstrative Russian military aircraft flying near the Latvian border, "threatening" statements of Russian politicians - it's all just about it. Further, it is likely there will be some provocations on the border (and possibly shooting), abduction of border guards or police as "spies" (as it was in Estonia), etc. In fact, it is copying the tactics successfully used by North Korea against South Korea for many years, as well as the US and China. The goal is to convince your opponent that you are - a mad maniac, ready at any moment to undermine the nuclear warheads themselves and everyone else. When the degree culminates the maniac "suddenly" wakes up and says that he is ready to negotiate. And gets the assignment.
In addition, simultaneously in Latvia (and not only in Latvia, but we consider it as an example of it) will be mobilized pro-Kremlin lobby and agents. Who will play up your favorite themes (non-citizens and school system) and encourage local people to "act wisely." There will be several versions: some will argue that it is necessary to go to bow to the Russian Federation because it is important economically. Others will say that NATO still not come, and it is necessary to bow to tanks did not come. Third - refer to "European values", for which, again, you have to bend down.
This last point seems to be overlooked by many. Meanwhile, we should not forget that since the Soviet times the Kremlin has many supporters among the West European social democracy. It must also be noted that in recent years the West European socialist pro-Putin intensified lobby (quite likely that it gets a boost from Moscow). Therefore, it is expected that at the peak of acute Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia can get hit in the back with this side - especially an unexpected blow, because he will have a western direction.
How far can the Baltic touring of Putin’s circus go with its performances of the pseudo soviet rhetoric and famous “green people” sovetskoyazychnogo zelёnochelovecheskogo circus?
By and large, as far as it will give him. For example, in Latvia, we can point to two problems that can significantly complicate the situation. Despite the fact that local authorities and law enforcement agencies in general have learned to take a punch, these two flaws remain for years of independence.
The first one is the lack of a comprehensive approach to solving problems related to anti-Putin propaganda and political expansion. At the very least, it looks like a situational response by the Latvian state structures to one or another unpleasant episode for their action to the casual observer - while the opposing side begins to act systematically. It is obvious that the systematic work against the Russian propaganda should be opposed, where all three branches of government are coordinated and work closely with civil society. Counter-propaganda, in fact, doesn’t exist.
The second one is the silence of that part of the Russian population in Latvia, which does not support Putin's policies, but which, according to the official version, the Kremlin protects. If this segment of the Latvian society was fully represented in the media, to conduct information warfare against Latvia (and all the Baltic countries) would be much more difficult.
It is very likely that these two issues - and whether the authorities of Latvia and the EU will endeavor to resolve them - and determine the political climate in the Baltic region in the near future.
 Vladislav Yuryevich Surkov, the First Deputy Chief of the Russian Presidential Administration from 1999 to 2011, during which time he was widely seen as the main ideologist of the Kremlin who proposed and implemented the concept of sovereign democracy in Russia.
 This term came from the annexation of Crimea. The green people are the part of Russian military forces who conducted the military operation in Crimea in 2014.